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THE SENATE'S POWER TO GIVE
"ADVICE AND CONSENT" IN JUDICIAL
APPOINTMENTS
CHRISTOPHER WOLFE*
What exactly is the role of the United States Senate in providing
"advice and consent" to presidential judicial nominations? This Article
argues that the Senate's power to advise and consent is indeed a broad
one. At the same time, however, it will show that there are in the Con-
stitution itself norms for the responsible use of that broad power.
I. VIEWS OF THE FOUNDING
A. The Convention of 1787
An examination of the debates of the Constitutional Convention
demonstrates the differences between the concerns regarding the judi-
cial nomination process in the 18th century and those of the present day.
The power to appoint the members of the judiciary was initially lodged
in the legislature by the Virginia plan, but that was changed early on-
without objection-to the Senate when James Madison pointed out that
a smaller, more select body would be likely to do the job better. It re-
mained that way for most of the Convention, despite some significant
debate-including even a tie vote which defeated a motion for presiden-
tial nomination with senatorial advice and consent An eleven member
special committee proposed presidential appointment with the advice
and consent of the Senate on September 4,3 and this proposal was
adopted on September 7.4
* Professor of Politcal Science, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Ph.D.,
Boston College, 1978; B.A., University of Notre Dame, 1971. This article was delivered as a
paper at the conference "Reining in Judicial Imperialism," sponsored by the American Public
Philosophy Institute in Washington, D.C., October 1-2, 1998. It will appear as part of a forth-
coming book based on the conference.
1. See 1 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1797, at
233 (1911).
2. See 2 id. at44.
3. See i at 493-95.
4. See id at 539-40.
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There were three main arguments in the debate over executive ver-
sus Senate appointment. First, which branch was more likely to be fa-
miliar with fit appointees? Second, which branch could be held respon-
sible more effectively? Third, which branch was more likely to be
subject to "cabal"? It was argued that as a national official, the presi-
dent would be more likely to know fit characters throughout the coun-
try He also would be more clearly responsible for his choices and less
subject to "intrigue and cabal" than a larger body would be.6 The Sen-
ate's supporters argued that it, rather than the president, would be more
likely to know men throughout the whole breadth of the nation and less
likely to favor a particular state or those near the seat of government.!
Underlying these arguments, although only occasionally brought out
in debate, was the crucial fact that by mid-July the Convention had
adopted the Connecticut Compromise, which provided for a Senate with
equal state representation! Thereafter, the small states tried to maxi-
mize the power of the Senate, while others tried to resist their efforts.
Madison suggested that excessive Senate power was unfair not only to
the large states, but also to the southern states as well.9 By the end of
the Convention, the Senate had gained enough power for several small
state delegates to acquiesce in actually limiting the Senate's power.'Y
This unease over creating a potential aristocracy, as Wilson put his fears
on September 6,11 may have had something to do with the shift to execu-
tive appointment.
Despite arguments advocating unrestricted presidential appointment
power, the Convention provided for senatorial advice and consent.
The main reason given was to guard against "any incautious or corrupt
nomination by the Executive," and against "any flagrant partiality and
error." 3 Underlying the desire for this security were two factors. First,
states were naturally concerned that their citizens might be excluded
5. See 2 MAx FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1797, at 42
(1911).
6. Id.
7. See iL at 41, 81.
8. See id. at 15.
9. See id. at 81.
10. See id For example, on September 6, Delegate Roger Sherman of Connecticut
made the proposal to take from the Senate and give to the House of Representatives (each
state having one vote) the power to elect the president in cases where there was no majority
in the Electoral College. See id at 527.
11. See id. at 522.
12. See id. at 43.
13. Id at 80.
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from consideration if a president made nominations from those closest
to him, especially from his state. 4 Second, part of the background of the
appointment power was the frequently discussed manner in which the
English king had maintained control of Parliament through his patron-
age power.' (Simply put, the king "bought" a lot of people.) Some
delegates, then, were concerned that a president might use appointment
to draw too much power to himself.6
Still, some of the delegates were concerned that the Senate's power
to advise and consent would not amount to much. Ellsworth of Con-
necticut thought that "[t]he right to supersede his nomination will be
ideal only. A nomination under such circumstances will be equivalent
to an appointment."' 7 But most of the delegates apparently considered
the requirement of Senate consent a worthwhile "security" for the
proper exercise of the appointment power.'8
Noticeably absent from the debates is any argument about the need
for a Senate check on the president's power to appoint judges on the
grounds of ideological concerns. That can be explained by two factors.
First, the convention delegates generally shared the view that judges
were not policy-makers, and therefore the political views of judges were
not relevant to the judicial appointment. Second, since the Constitution
had not yet been put into operation, different partisan views had not yet
developed within the constitutional system, especially competing inter-
pretations of the document. Therefore the "constitutional philosophies"
of judges were not thought of as a crucial concern. To the extent that it
was considered, it would have been a concern that judges be loyal to the
Constitution, as they were required to be by oath.
B. The Federalist
Alexander Hamilton takes up the appointment power in Federalist
No. 76, an authoritative early exposition of the Constitution.' 9 He de-
14. See 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1797, at
42 (1911). One must remember that state ties were much closer at the founding than they are
now.
15. See id. at 31.
16. See id at 43. This was the source of the provision that seemed to rule out a Reagan
nomination of someone like Senator Orrin Hatch in the mid-1980s, namely, that no legislator
may be appointed, during the term for which he was elected, to an office which was created or
whose pay has been increased during that term. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6.
17. 2 FARRAND, supra note 1, at 81.
18. Id. at 83.
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 385 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
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fends presidential appointment (versus appointment by a select body of
moderate number) by emphasizing that a president's clear and sole re-
sponsibility will sharpen his sense of duty and desire for reputation, and
lead him to seek the best men for offices.' ° His personal attachments
(ties of friendship and affection) will be fewer than the cumulative fig-
ure of such partialities of a body of men.21 He would not be subject as
much to "the private and party likings and dislikes, partialities and an-
tipathies, attachments and animosities, which are felt by those who
compose the assembly."" Moreover, the compromises and logrolling
necessary to get a legislative majority would often result in unfit ap-
pointments.2
Hamilton also argued, however, that the requirement of senatorial
assent was valuable.24 It would not undermine the advantages involved
in presidential appointing, since this responsibility would still produce
the necessary motives for doing it well.2i Nor was it likely to be used of-
ten, especially because rejection put the nomination back in the hands of
the president, whose next choice might not be any better.'
Why require the Senate's advice and consent? On this point, which
is most directly relevant to this Article's inquiry, Hamilton stated that it
"would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the Presi-
dent, and would tend greatly to preventing the appointment of unfit
characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal
attachment, or from a view to popularity."'' Out of a concern for both
reputation and re-election, the president would be "ashamed and
afraid" to bring forward unmeritorious candidates, whose only qualifica-
tions would be coming from particular states, or being personally allied
to the president, or "possessing the necessary insignificance and pliancy
to render them the obsequious instruments of his pleasure." '
The thrust of Hamilton's discussion is to suggest that the great desid-
eratum regarding the appointment power is to secure "merit" by resist-
ing temptations to geographic partiality (especially state) and personal
partiality. In what would the merit consist? James Madison, in Feder-











alist No. 51, suggests that there is something different about the qualifi-
cations of judges-so much so as to warrant making it an exception to
the general principle (rooted in separation of powers) that no branch
should participate in selecting another: "In the constitution of the judi-
ciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigor-
ously on the principle; first, because peculiar qualifications being essen-
tial in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that
mode of choice, which best secures these qualifications," and second,
because permanent tenure attenuates problems of dependence.29
The essential judicial qualifications apparently seemed so obvious to
Madison (and, he appears to have assumed, his readers) that he did not
bother to describe them. Hamilton discusses them briefly at the end of
Federalist No. 78. He argues that a voluminous code of laws is a neces-
sary inconvenience of free government, for "[t]o avoid an arbitrary dis-
cretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down
by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their
duty in every particular case that comes before them."30 However, the
records of precedents are very bulky and require long and laborious
study. The result is that "few men... will have sufficient skill in the
laws to qualify them for the stations of judges."'" Fewer still have the
knowledge and the necessary integrity.
If these are the primary qualifications of judges, and the requirement
of Senate advice and consent is to ensure merit, then presumably the job
of the Senate is to ensure that nominees have both the requisite knowl-
edge of the law ("the rules and precedents") and the requisite integrity.
The only hint of any requirement regarding substantive views of nomi-
nees is that they not be so "pliable" as to be "instruments" in the hands
of the president."
II. HISTORICAL EXERCISE OF THE POWER TO ADVISE AND CONSENT
How has the Senate exercised its power to advise and consent to ex-
ecutive nominations for Supreme Court positions? In my description of
the history of Senate advice and consent, I will concentrate almost ex-
clusively on those instances in which the Senate has rejected presidential
nominations. This history demonstrates, as one scholar has shown, that
the great majority of rejections can be explained by three factors: (1)
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 348 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
30. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 399 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
31. Id
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 386 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
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partisanship-cases in which the Senate and the presidency have been
controlled by different parties; (2) timing-cases in which an appoint-
ment fell within the last year of a president's term; and (3) senatorial
courtesy-the practice of the Senate deferring to a senator of the presi-
dent's party who opposes a nomination to a judicial office involving his
state.33 This latter case is usually used with respect to district court
judges, and only rarely applicable to a Supreme Court nomination.
A. Pre-Civil War
Before the Civil War, the Senate rejected thirteen men, one of them
on two occasions.34 Of these, ten were rejected when the Senate was
controlled by the opposition party either in an election year or after an
election but before the incoming president had taken office. 5 Another
was rejected by an opposition Senate on grounds of hostility to previous
political action.3' Another was rejected, before there were firm party
lineups, on mixed grounds, including past political action, failure to
serve on the Court after a previous appointment, and personal (mental)
instability.37 Another rejection involved a mixture of political opposi-
tion and lack of legal distinction.38 The final rejection was one of several
where a major factor was opposition of a state senator to a nominee
filling a seat that had become a "state seat" on the Court.39
B. Post-Civil War
Between 1866 and 1894, the Senate rejected seven more nominees.'
One vacancy was abolished to deny Andrew Johnson an appointment.1
An opposition Senate refused to confirm an outgoing president's nomi-
33. See ROBERT G. SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESIDENCY 96-105
(1971). The material from this section of this Article is largely based on this analysis of Sen-
ate rejections of presidential nominations for the Supreme Court.
34. See id. at 96 n.14.
35. See id. at 99 n.18.
36. Taney, for his implementation as Treasury Secretary of Andrew Jackson's command
to withdraw U.S. funds from the Bank of the United States. See id-
37. Rutledge, in 1795, relative to his opposition to the Jay Treaty, which alienated Sen-
ate Federalists. See id.
38. Alexander Wolcott, opposed by New Englanders for his strict enforcement of em-
bargo and nonintercourse acts, as collector of customs, an office he had held; but his legal
abilities-or lack thereof-were also a major ground of opposition. See i.
39. The nomination of George Woodward for what had become a "Pennsylvania seat"
on the Court was rejected in 1845; but another factor was his nativist views as well. See i.
40. See id. at 96 n.14.
41. Stanbury, in 1866. See i.
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nation on one occasion.42 Two rejections involved senatorial courtesy.43
One was clearly based on the lack of legal eminence of the nominee.'
The other two rejections involved some opposition to past political ac-
tions and personal characteristics.45
C. Twentieth Century
Between 1894 and 1968, the Senate rejected just one nominee, John
J. Parker in 1930. His rejection was due in large part because of opposi-
tion from labor and civil rights groups.4 In a somewhat attenuated
sense, Parker's rejection could be considered an example of an opposi-
tion Senate, since there was a narrow Republican majority in the Senate,
but one would have to consider the bloc of Progressive Republicans
(such as LaFollette and Norris) to get the real measure of the Senate's
politics.
The rarity of rejections throughout this period has been explained in
various ways, but certainly one of the chief reasons is that there were
few appointments by presidents who faced opposition Senates during
this period. Only Truman and Eisenhower, in fact, faced opposition
Senates. Only Eisenhower faced one during an election year, and in
that case he chose a New Jersey Democrat, William Brennan, who was
acceptable to the Senatef
The reassertion of the Senate prerogative to reject in 1968 to 1970, in
the Senate battles over Abe Fortas' nomination to succeed Earl Warren
and Richard Nixon's efforts to get Southerners Clement Haynsworth
and G. Harrold Carswell on the Court, is accounted for by a number of
factors. Lyndon Johnson was a weak, lame-duck president in 1968,
when he appointed Abe Fortas, while the Republicans looked forward
to one of their own becoming president. The resentment of the opposi-
42. Matthews, appointed by Hayes in 1881-although he made it to the Court with the
next president, Garfield. See id.
43. Hornblower and Peckham were denied the "New York seat" in 1893 and 1894. See
id
44. Williams, in 1873. See id.
45. Hoar, in 1870, had made enemies by his personality, by certain recommendations as
attorney general for circuit court appointments, and by his opposition to the impeachment of
Johnson and support for civil service reform; Cushing, in 1874, had made enemies with very
erratic political party affiliations over his career and also was the victim of misuse of a letter
he had written to Jefferson Davis in 1861. See id.
46. See PHILLIP COOPER, THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT FROM THE INSIDE
OUT 52 (1996).




tion Democratic Senate over the Fortas rejection, combined with ques-
tions of judicial ethics (alleged insensitivity to conflicts of interest) and
political factors similar to those in the Parker nomination (civil rights
and labor opposition), led to Haynsworth's defeat.4 Carswell's rejection
was based especially on civil rights opposition (involving a white su-
premacist declaration of his early career) and his very dubious legal
qualifications in the face of an opposition Senate.49
The most recent, and very significant, Senate rejection-Robert
Bork in 1987--occurred at a time when the Senate was newly controlled
by the opposition Democratic Party. Bork's rejection also took place
during the last two years of the second term of Republican President
Ronald Reagan, already seriously weakened by the Iran-Contra contro-
versy. Other key factors contributing to his defeat were confirmation
hearings in which he failed to strike a popular chord, and his early ca-
reer opposition to the 1964 Civil Rights Act. That opposition was used
effectively to mobilize political opposition to him, especially in key
southern states, the support of whose Democratic representatives was
essential to Bork's nomination.'
More generally, the Bork defeat may have represented an increased
recognition-with the greater salience of Supreme Court decisions
themselves as political issues-that the Court plays a fundamentally po-
litical role in modern American politics. As political scientist Lawrence
Baum notes: "[P]robably the key explanation for the intense scrutiny
given to recent nominations is the increased prominence of the Supreme
Court in the resolution of significant and controversial policy issues."51
In Bork's case, the balance of the Court was (rightly) thought to be at
issue, so there was an unusually massive mobilization against his nomi-
nation.
48. See LAURENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 36 (1995).
49. See MALTESE, supra note 47, at 14.
50. See BAUM, supra note 48, at 36,57.
51. Ia at 53.
52 See generally id. I have focused here on the Senate rejections. A broader view, that
took into account successful, but not easy, confirmations (such as Justice William Rehnquist's
nomination as Chief Justice in 1986 and Clarence Thomas's nomination in 1990) would rein-
force the suggestion that there may have been recent changes in the nature of the Supreme
Court nomination process. On the other side, one must account for the very easy confirma-




III. PARTISANSHIP, IDEOLOGY, AND ADVICE AND CONSENT
This quick review of Senate rejections is only a partial history, of
course. On the face of it, it might tempt one to make the argument that
Senate confirmation is simply a straightforward political issue. But
there are sound reasons not to make such a judgment.
For example, one could also analyze why some presidents succeeded
in getting nominees through opposition Senates, even at the end of their
terms. After all, on thirty-six occasions when the Senate and presidency
were controlled by different parties, presidential nominations were suc-
cessful twenty times.' Even when that situation occurred in the last
year of a president's term, six out of seventeen have been confirmed.
What accounts for those successes? Part of it, especially in the latter
case, is that presidents realize that they must be more careful or accom-
modating in their selections. But another part of it is that senators are
reluctant to base their opposition to a nomination simply on partisan
grounds. Somehow, such grounds lack a certain kind of legitimacy,
however real they are in practice. Usually, some factor other than parti-
sanship alone must be present to make a respectable public case against
a nominee.
The use of the term "partisanship" in this discussion presents an am-
biguity, however, as there are very different strands of partisanship.
One strand is the simple fact of patronage. One does not appoint mem-
bers of opposition parties to important-or even unimportant-offices,
because the distribution of offices is an essential ingredient to main-
taining political group cohesion, and parties naturally feel that such ap-
pointments ought to be given as rewards to their own members rather
than to opponents.' 4 The intensely "practical" aspect of this rationale
for acting makes it difficult to defend publicly as a matter of principle,
although that is not a significant limitation to its being done. One factor
limiting this ground, however, is that it should not prevent filling a Court
seat for an undue period of time. Perhaps the only Senate to systemati-
cally prevent presidential nominations for an extended period of time on
53. This is based on an updating of Robert Scigliano's figures. See generally SCIGLIANO,
supra note 33. Scigliano estimates that until mid-1970, there were twenty-six cases in which
the Senate and presidency were controlled by different parties, and of these nominations, fif-
teen (57%) were rejected. Extending these figures through 1998 (a period that includes long
spells of "divided government"), there are thirty-six cases, with only sixteen being rejected
(only 44%).
54. This particularly explains opposition to appointments, more frequent before the 20th




partisan grounds was the Radical Republican Congress under Andrew
Johnson.55 Its reputation has not been enhanced by its manipulation of
the size of the Court, in particular, to accomplish this. Few public fig-
ures, if any, would defend such a course of action today. The prospect
of a shift of partisan control of the presidency must be relatively close at
hand (usually during the election year) to justify frank partisan rejection
of nominations.
But there is another strand of "partisanship," which is much more
defensible theoretically, and which can be defended as something much
more than "mere" partisanship. Often the division between parties in-
cludes important theoretical, or "ideological," differences. These can be
relatively specific public policy positions-such as support of or opposi-
tion to a particular treaty, congressional powers to establish a national
bank or declare paper money legal tender, or civil service reform, or
abortion. But they also often merge into higher theoretical levels of de-
bate about "constitutional principles"-such as nationalism versus
states' rights, slavery and the Declaration, abortion and the right to life
or right to privacy, and the "judicial philosophies" of "strict" or "loose"
constructionism. What role should these ideological factors play in ap-
pointments to the Supreme Court, including Senate advice and consent?
That partisanship is a legitimate factor, in some sense, is undeniable.
The sense in which it is understood, however, is crucial to its legitimacy.
Examining the constitutional text, we should observe what is often
the most important facet of a text, namely, what is not there. The text
simply does not specify the grounds for Senate advice and consent any
more than it specifies the grounds for presidential appointment. In this
respect, it is quite unlike the impeachment power, for which the Consti-
tution specifies particular grounds: "Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors. '" 56 Strictly speaking, then, there is no spe-
cific constitutional limitation on the Senate's power to advise and con-
sent. That would be a political question, in the sense that Congress has
every right to exercise its own discretion in determining what constitutes
the qualifications for a Supreme Court Justice and whether a nominee
meets them.
And yet this does not mean that there are no reasonable limits on
the Senate, even if no one (except those who will eventually vote for or
against the senators' re-election) can enforce them. I have already given
an example of one limit: virtually no one would argue that a freshly
55. See MALTESE, supra note 47, at 35.
56. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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elected Senate of one party could "legitimately" deny every nomination
of a newly elected president simply because of the president's party af-
filiation. There are other examples as well. Would the Senate be justi-
fied in refusing to confirm the nomination of a lower court judge on the
grounds that he had struck down a Congressional bill of attainder? That
is, could someone be rejected on the grounds that he had refused to
violate the Constitution?' How many today would justify opposition to
a nominee simply because he was black, or she was a woman? Regional
balance would not be ruled out completely, but what if a senator would
vote only for Southerners, irrespective of how many Southerners were
already on the Court?
These are examples of what would generally be conceded to be "ar-
bitrary" or "unreasonable" uses of the conceded Senate power. Some-
thing more than that is required, something arguably related to the
qualifications of a good Supreme Court Justice. In this respect, the
power of advice and consent is similar to one aspect of the impeachment
power. "Treason" and "bribery" have better defined content than
"other high Crimes and Misdemeanors," and the latter phrase has occa-
sioned considerable debate. Some have argued that it limits grounds for
impeachment to indictable crimes (e.g., Nixon's lawyer in the Watergate
controversy). Others have argued that it means "whatever a majority of
the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given moment in
history" (e.g., Gerald Ford relative to an attempted impeachment of Jus-
tice William 0. Douglas)." Ford is closer to the truth but goes too far.
Being a Republican (or Democrat), for example, by itself could hardly
be considered a "high Crime" or "Misdemeanor." The Congress may be
uncontrollable by any other branch in its impeaching of a judge, but that
is not equivalent to saying that all its impeachments are automatically
legitimate. Congress has the final say, as a matter of political power and
it can properly employ a broad political understanding of "high Crimes
and Misdemeanors," as Hamilton shows in Federalist No. 65, but it is not
unlimited in its discretion, as a matter of political right.
The Senate's power with respect to appointments is not even limited
by specific constitutional criteria such as the grounds for impeachment.
But, if all agree that the power could be used illegitimately by employ-
ing "arbitrary criteria,' then where do limits come from? Presumably
criteria are arbitrary when they do not relate to a nominee's capacity to
57. Of course, there might be arguments as to whether this or that law was a bill of at-
tainder; but that is a separate issue.
58. Impeachment Mostly Political, THE CINCINNATI POST, Jan. 24, 1998, at 4A.
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perform the duties of the office satisfactorily, defining such satisfactory
performance in a quite broad sense. Therefore, questions of the appro-
priate exercise of the Senate's power to advise and consent seem to
come down to an understanding of how judges should perform their du-
ties and what qualities are required for them. That is, the criteria for
confirmation ultimately must be pushed back to the question of the na-
ture of judicial power in our constitutional system.
Some of the criteria are relatively clear-cut, and do not need discus-
sion in the present context. For example, a person who is not a lawyer
(or, at least, who does not have the knowledge of the legal system and
its basic procedures that lawyers must have) would not have an essential
qualification for the office. Indeed, for the Supreme Court, one would
expect more than just minimal legal expertise. One would expect ex-
cellence in the capacity to deal with the "rules and precedents" of our
law, to which Hamilton referred.59 Likewise, one would expect strict
personal and professional integrity, as both Justice Fortas and Judge
Haynsworth learned; though neither of them had violated any law, one
was forced to resign and the other was rejected by the Senate at least
partly because of failures to live up to a strict code of judicial ethics.60
But perhaps there are important and legitimate "political grounds,"
in some sense, that must be considered in the whole appointment proc-
ess by both the president and the Senate.
IV. "POLITICAL" CRITERIA FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES
The predominant lens through which legal history is viewed today is
legal realism, which, in varying degrees according to its more or less ex-
treme forms, holds that judges are basically "politicians in robes." The
ultimate determinants of judicial decisions are the social and political
views of the judges, rather than "mere" interpretation of law.
Legal realism seems to have rather strong empirical support from
the historical record. Marshall was a Federalist and took strong nation-
alistic views. Taney was a Jacksonian Democrat and took strong states'
rights views, and so on down to the egalitarianism and libertarianism of
Warren, Black, Douglas, and Brennan and the conservatism of Burger
and Rehnquist. Occasionally judges break the mold, as the "political
liberal" but "judicial conservative" Frankfurter seemed to, but even he
59. See supra note 30.
60. See MALTESE, supra note 47, at 14.
61. See, e.g., WILFRID E. RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM,
REFORM AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1968).
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endorsed a moderate legal realism, as many of his comments on his
hero, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., attest.62
Legal realism can certainly point to evidence of political judges, but
at the same time it is not proof that judges must be political. Not even
the argument that any judge can be faulted for some of his decisions
proves this. There is at least some evidence on the other side, that law
itself, rather than judges' personal views, can genuinely determine judi-
cial decisions. Perhaps the most interesting fact is simply the many
unanimous decisions that appellate courts hand down each year. A less
obvious, but important, piece of evidence is found in the very proof that
legal realists use to discount the law. The typical first step in an argu-
ment for legal realism is the citation of cases in which judges have dis-
torted the law in the service of their own political views. But the very
argument that judges have distorted the law is testimony to a belief that
the undistorted law can indeed be known and that the distortion is not
therefore inevitable.
There is a large gap between the proposition that judges' decisions
are sometimes shaped by their political views and the proposition that
they must be shaped by them. The first, unlike the second, is compatible
with the more traditional (pre- and anti-legal realist) position that
judges ought to follow the law, are capable of following it, and may be
justly criticized when they do not. If no particular judge ever fully lives
up to the ideal, that is no reason to dispense with the ideal. It is this
ideal that underlies the Constitution's provisions for judicial power and
the early practice of American political history.
Legal realism, on the other hand, has been dominant in the legal
profession since the turn of the century, and is the foundation for con-
temporary constitutional law. The shift from the former to the latter is
tied up with a change in the very nature of judicial review in the course
of American history, and necessarily results in a different understanding
of the power of appointing the judges who will exercise that power.
Are legal realists correct when they argue that judges are merely
politicians in robes, and is it inevitable, then, that judges ought to be ap-
pointed primarily with a view to their political opinions? The answer is
complicated by the equivocal use of the word "political."
62. See, e.g., Alfred S. Neely, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's Iconography of Judging, 82 KY.
LJ. 535 (1993); MR. JUSTICE HOLMES (Felix Frankfurter, ed. 1931).
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V. THE "CONSTITUTIONAL VIEWS" OF NOMINEES
The most important power exercised by the Supreme Court is the
power of judicial review, the power to strike down laws or actions made
by the more accountable political branches in our constitutional system.
In a certain sense, this power is political, because it is a determining fac-
tor in public policy when it is exercised. But the deeper and more cru-
cial question is whether the power consists of the exercise of judicial will
or the application of the will of the law. To the extent that the determi-
nation of public policy which results from judicial review flows from ju-
dicial application of the will of the law, there seems to be no problem
from the standpoint of democratic principles. If judicial political views
in the more immediate sense-judicial will-are the basis of decisions
which dictate public policy in important respects, serious questions are
raised in a generally democratic society.
A. Traditional Views
During roughly the first century of American history, there was gen-
eral agreement that judges were to exercise judgment, not will.63 There
were many bitter disputes over constitutional issues and judicial deci-
sions, but the debaters shared the same general ideal: the judge was to
enforce the law, above all, the fundamental law of the Constitution, and
not his own will or his own political preferences." It is true that in gen-
eral Marshall gave a "Federalist" reading to the document and Taney a
"States' rights" view. But it is also true that on occasion Marshall re-
stricted national powers (e.g., he refused to apply the Bill of Rights to
the states, which would have ensured federal judicial control over many
state actions), and Taney upheld doctrines more typically associated
with Federalists (e.g., in cases where he vigorously enforced the contract
clause). And both of them agreed that the Constitution had a meaning
which was authoritative, even though they sometimes disagreed on what
that meaning was.6
Thus, in early American history, disputes over the judicial appoint-
63. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
64. See generally CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW 17-
117 (1986).
65. While it would be something of a digression to get into the issue too far, I will at
least indicate here my opinion that Marshall was generally the more correct in his reading of
the document. After all, the Constitution was in its origins a Federalist document. But it is
probably just as important to note that, whoever was correct, both of them believed strongly
that there was a correct view, and would have rejected the notion that the Constitution was
whatever an interpreter wanted it to mean. See id. at 384-88.
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ments certainly took into account nominees' (and potential nominees')
political views as they were reflected in their constitutional views. The
primary job of the Court was, after all, to be a "bulwark" of the Consti-
tution against attempts to violate it. Accordingly, the constitutional
views of potential justices were clearly an important part of their qualifi-
cations for the office. But whatever the differences in their particular
views, the various parties shared the ideal that the Constitution did have
a fixed and cognizable meaning and was the standard by which to judge
nominees."
This attention to such "political" views is cited in support of making
the political views of nominees a criterion of Senate judgment today as
well. But, in fact, the intellectual framework of those who make these
current arguments is quite different. That is because the whole notion
of "constitutional views" has been transformed by legal realism in the
twentieth century. Only with an understanding of that change can we
understand clearly the proper constitutional scope of the Senate's power
to advise and consent.
B. The Transformation of Judicial Power
What we call "judicial review" today is quite different from tradi-
tional conceptions of judicial review. The process by which an essen-
tially changed meaning was given to the words was a slow and compli-
cated one, but it can be summarized briefly in the following way.67
From the end of the nineteenth century to 1937, the Supreme Court
engaged in a new, activist form of judicial review, although the justices
firmly argued-and their opponents seemed to confirm-that they were
only doing what American judges had always done. The most important
element of the new activism of the Court was the use of the due process
clause as a vague general guarantee of fundamental rights, including
above all freedom of contract, or property rights. Because the Constitu-
tion only embodied the right vaguely, in the allegedly amorphous con-
fines of the due process clause, the job of defining and enforcing prop-
erty rights-giving content to the clause-was left to the justices. Since
the justices of that era for the most part had laissez-faire economic
views, which reflected the prevailing ideology of the legal profession
during their formative professional years, the judges quite naturally re-
garded economic regulation with considerable reserve, suspicion, or hos-
66. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
67. For a more complete treatment of the following points, see generally WOLFE, supra
note 64, at 119-322.
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tility, often finding it incompatible with fundamental rights.'
It was easy to think that this was what the framers had provided for,
since the founding generation did, in fact, have a high regard for prop-
erty rights, and did seek to protect them, for example, through the con-
tract clause. But the mainstream position of the founding era was that
judicial review was limited to clear violations of the Constitution, and
the due process clause was considered a matter of legal procedure rather
than fundamental rights. It was no accident, then, that the due process
clause was not used in that period as a vague general guarantee of fun-
damental rights."
Ironically, the enemies of laissez-faire due process, who could have
pointed out that the Court had departed from the Constitution, instead
generally conceded that the Court was being faithful to original intent,
and argued that the original intent was outdated and ought to be re-
placed with new views more appropriate for modem circumstances.
They did this without scuttling the Constitution entirely, by accepting
the elevation of the due process clause to a vague general guarantee of
fundamental rights, but then arguing that the new notions of what fun-
damental rights consist of ought to be controlling.0
In these initial phases of the development of modem judicial power,
the argument for giving constitutional phrases a new, more up-to-date
meaning was used to defend legislative enactments against judicial re-
view; that is, it was used as a grounds for judicial restraint. But the same
kind of argument could be used to give a new judicially enforceable
meaning to the Constitution as well, which could be used as an instru-
ment of judicial activism to strike down legislative enactments. That is
precisely the direction that modem judicial review eventually took.7
Beginning in the late 1930s, the Court slowly developed a much
heightened protection of certain "preferred freedoms" (expanded con-
ceptions of freedom of speech and religion),n Then, in 1954, its Brown
v. Board of Education" decision transformed American political life,
serving as a catalyst for the civil rights movement. The success in trans-
forming race relations in the nation armed the Court with both consid-
erable moral authority and confidence that it could serve the same noble
68. See id at 223-41.
69. See id at 17-37.
70. See id at 144-60.
71. See id at 258-89.
72. See id. at 248-56.
73. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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purposes in other areas, and in the 1960s it undertook to further social
reform in a number of areas: e.g., criminal defendants' rights, reappor-
tionment, equal protection, and privacy. The Burger and Rehnquist
Courts that followed were more erratic, cutting short or nibbling at the
edges of some Warren Court precedents, extending others dramatically,
and adopting more middle-of-the-road policies in some areas, but in
general not departing from the general approach to judicial decision
making.74
The modem approach can be characterized in this way: Constitu-
tional provisions are not absolutes to be taken literally, but rather
should be considered as stating presumptions in favor of certain princi-
ples, such as liberty (due process), equality (equal protection), and free-
dom of speech and religion (First Amendment). The job of "interpreta-
tion" is really one of applying these principles by weighing them against
competing considerations as cases arise, with the burden of proof lying
more heavily on the state to justify its regulation in proportion to the
importance of the individual right being asserted. The job of the courts
can thus be viewed as thinking through the foundations and implications
of various competing social principles and establishing the proximate
rules by which they will be balanced against each other and applied in
particular situations. So viewed, it is clearly a legislative more than an
interpretive power-will rather than judgment-and it is frequently de-
fended precisely on the grounds that the Court has done a better job of
making policy regarding individual rights than legislatures have.7
The new form of judicial review required a new theoretical founda-
tion. This was clearly seen by Alexander Bickel. In his 1962 book The
Least Dangerous Branch, he opened with an attack on Marbury v.
Madison76 as an inadequate foundation for the practice of judicial re-
view.? What was needed, he said, was principled justification for it in
the form of a policymaking power that the courts could exercise, that
others were unlikely to perform, and which did not tread unacceptably
on the other branches' responsibilities. The history of constitutional
commentary throughout the period since then can be characterized as a
search for such a new justification.
This understanding dominant in the scholarship on judicial review
74. See WOLFE, supra note 64, at 292-321,359-77.
75. See id at 327; see also CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, JUDICIAL ACrIvISM 73-75 (1997).
76. 1 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch 1803).
77. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 1-14 (1962).
78. See id at 24.
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underlies the contemporary practice of judicial review, but with a sig-
nificant difference: the Court does not put forward publicly such a the-
ory of judicial review. In its practice, it still facially operates as if judicial
review consisted of what Marbury v. Madison described: judges de-
fending the Constitution against laws that violate it. Why doesn't the
Court come forward with a new explanation of what it is doing, one that
is more in line with the general view of the legal profession that judges
exercise what is fundamentally a legislative power? One suspects that it
is because no one is sure whether the legitimacy of the Court's exercise
of judicial review could survive such an admission. And the Supreme
Court's power, after all, is unusually dependent (especially in any con-
troversy where it lacks the vigorous support of the president) upon its
prestige or "moral capital" or legitimacy.79
Or, to put it another way: For all the success of legal realism among
scholars, intellectuals, and lawyers, it has not been established in the
sphere of public discourse so clearly as to be able to dispense with what
legal realists consider "the myth of the Constitution." That is why, as
Bickel pointed out, "in almost regular cyclical fashion, we witness atavis-
tic regressions to the simplicities of Marbury v. Madison."+
VI. DISTORTIONS OF THE SENATE'S ADVICE AND CONSENT POWER
The ambivalence about publicly proclaiming the nature of modem
judicial power has had curious effects on the process of advice and con-
sent. If legal realism is correct, and if it is publicly stated as one's under-
standing of judicial power, then one would expect senators simply to say
that they are going to vote for or against a nominee because of his po-
litical (i.e., policy) views. In fact, few senators do so-perhaps none as
baldly as that.
There is a considerable reluctance to appear "political" in the
evaluation of nominees for judicial office. Moreover, one ground of
criticism of judicial nominees is sometimes that they are too political, as
occurred with some Reagan judicial nominations (and certainly with
some earlier Democratic nominations). In both cases, the assumption
was that judges ought not to be "political."
One result of this tendency has been to focus considerable attention
on legal credentials, whenever this is a plausible ground." This is not
79. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,866 (1992).
80. BICKEL, supra note 77, at 74.
81. See, e.g., William Bradford-Reynolds, Senate Confirmation Not Always Fair-But
Necessary, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 3, 1997, at 47.
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usually a question of minimal legal qualifications, but of the exceptional
abilities that one expects of a Supreme Court nominee. But in border-
line cases, evaluations of "professional" qualifications can certainly be
affected by seeing them through the prism of ideological views. Candi-
dates for judicial office who have middling abilities and ideological
views contrary to those that are dominant in the legal profession may
have more difficulties than middling candidates of more conventional
views.
Nelson Polsby once wrote a perceptive article on "Presidential
Greatness" in which he pointed out that the ranking of "great presi-
dents" is usually done by historians and political scientists whose politi-
cal views were forged in the fire of the Depression and New Deal, and
for whom greatness is typically associated with the "strong" presidency
of Franklin Roosevelt." One effect of that tendency was to undervalue
presidents who were not so assertive publicly, such as Dwight
Eisenhower. One may surmise that similar underlying ideological fac-
tors affect evaluation of judicial or legal abilities. For example, in a 1970
poll of history, political science, and law scholars, a number of the jus-
tices who were part of the laissez-faire Court majorities (from roughly
1890 to 1937) received harsh treatment relative to justices from other
eras or ideologies, some of them being put in categories a notch below
their desserts, especially given some of those placed ahead of them." At
any rate, the issue of legal qualifications is subject to greater manipula-
tion than may appear at first glance.
When legal qualifications are not a plausible issue, another tendency
is to do some muckraking in the nominee's past, trying to find an issue
that can either be raised as a question of personal ethics and integrity, or
that will alienate key interest groups that have influence with senators.
On occasion, this can lead to considerable stretching of points, as in the
82. Nelson W. Polsby, Against Presidential Greatness, 63 COMMENTARY 61 (1977).
83. Not surprisingly, however, events after 1960 such as the Vietnam War and Watergate
contributed to a substantial revision in the evaluation of Eisenhower.
84. See ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & ROY M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED
JUSTICES 32-51 (1978). I think it would be difficult to defend the evaluation of VanDevanter
and Butler as "failures" (the lowest category), apart from ideological opposition, and the
ranking of Fortas as a "near great" (was this an overreaction to his having been forced off the
Court recently?). Of the twelve justices ranked as "great justices," apart from the historical
"shoo-ins" (Marshall, Story, and Taney), seven (possibly eight) were anti-laissez faire or
modern egalitarian justices. And will the long-run view really rank Brandeis, Stone, Cardozo,
Black, Frankfurter, and Warren-all "greats" according to the survey-ahead of Miller,
Bradley, Taft, and Sutherland-all of whom are ranked as "near greats"? Perhaps, but we




rather silly hubbub in 1986 about the deed to Rehnquist's home having
a restrictive covenant clause (one which had been legally unenforceable
for thirty-five years, and which, it turned out, was also present in the
deeds to the homes of some liberal Democrats in the Washington, D.C.
area).
On the other hand, this approach can escalate to an open pitched
battle, as it did in the Anita Hill allegations against Clarence Thomas,
which are still viewed in profoundly different ways by partisans of dif-
ferent stripes today. Of course, such muckraking is not restricted to ju-
dicial nominees-it is quite widespread today, and is often a way of dis-
crediting leading political figures. But it can be successful, and it has the
advantage of seeming more or less "nonpolitical" on its face, which
makes it an attractive method to discredit judicial nominees with whom
one disagrees on ideological grounds, without resting the case publicly
on those grounds.
When objecting to nominees on ideological grounds, it is possible to
minimize the political character of the opposition by adopting somewhat
indirect approaches. For example, one might object that the nominees'
views are "extreme," or argue that nominees with a different ideological
position would provide "better balance" on the Court. While this does
not avoid the question of political views completely, the "political"
character of the opposition is muted somewhat, since the objection is di-
rected less to the specific substance of the nominees' views than to their
general unrepresentativeness. The somewhat hidden implication is that,
since the nominees' views are distinctly outside the "mainstream," they
are probably somewhat idiosyncratic and not likely to be based on cor-
rect interpretations of the law.
The most controversial way to object to nominees on the grounds of
their political views (taken in either the broad or the narrow sense),
while avoiding the appearance of playing partisan politics with a nonpar-
tisan office such as a judicial position, is simply to argue that those views
are wrong constitutionally. That is, one can embrace what legal realists
consider the "myth of the Constitution"-namely, that the Constitution
has a definite and determined meaning that binds judges, and also those
who nominate and confirm them-and then argue that nominees' views
are not in accord with the Constitution.
This approach is perhaps easier for those who are identified with
"originalism" to adopt, because that position rejects the assumptions of
legal realism. Believing that there really is a cognizable and intelligible
Constitution with a fixed meaning, the invocation of "the real meaning"
of the Constitution should be perfectly plausible as a basis for evaluating
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judicial nominees in a non-partisan manner. But what if the "real
meaning" of the Constitution has become identified with one party?
What if "non-partisan" interpretation of the Constitution has become a
partisan political position?
For those who accept legal realism's assumptions, all views are parti-
san (although perhaps some are partisan in a more statesmanlike man-
ner). One possibility for them would be to adopt straightforwardly a
political stance, acknowledging that opposition to a given nominee
stems from the nominee's policy views. This method, however, smacks
too much of partisanship for many people. The so-called "myth" of the
Constitution still has a powerful hold on us.
An alternative is to argue, somewhat ambiguously, that the nominee
does not hold the "right" constitutional views, suggesting that this crite-
rion transcends ordinary policy views even if the (unstated) criterion for
"correct constitutional views" is basically having correct policy out-
comes. This can be awkward, however, if the core objection to a nomi-
nee is that he or she is too likely to abide by a fair reading of the Consti-
tution itself as it was understood by those who wrote it. How can one
make a credible ideological case against a nominee on the basis of the
Constitution when one believes not that the Constitution is fixed, but
that judges ought to keep it up-to-date by giving it an "evolving" mean-
ing, one which will fit (the judicial perception of) the needs of the time?
One way to accomplish this somewhat indirectly can be seen in the
case of Judge Bork. He was hostile to some leading Court decisions
which had rather tenuous roots, if any, in the Constitution itself.' Thus,
he was challenged for being "outside the mainstream." By identifying
the Constitution with what the Supreme Court had said it meant in
those cases, Bork's opposition to past decisions of the Court was trans-
muted into opposition to the Constitution itself.
So, for example, an opponent of originalism could take the abortion
decision in Roe v. Wade and use criticism of that decision as a basis for
arguing that the critic is opposed to some "important constitutional
rights," even though abortion rights are a recent Court creation without
any roots in the Constitution itself. Opponents can thus wrap them-
selves in the folds of the Constitution while defending decisions which
are really only judicial accretions to it.
These distortions of the advice and consent process reflect "our"
schizophrenic thought about the Constitution. Legal elites generally
85. Most obviously, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
86. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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take a legal realist view that emphasizes the inevitability and even desir-
ability of judges bringing political views to bear on constitutional adjudi-
cation (though there is a spectrum of views as to how much discretion
judges have to apply these views). But politicians are reluctant to make
these views the explicit grounds for evaluating judicial nominations (just
as judges are leery about proclaiming from the bench that they "make"
law rather than merely interpret it). At least part of the reason for this
reluctance is that they have insufficient confidence (probably justified,
in my opinion) that popular opinion, encouraged by a minority of schol-
ars associated especially with originalism, will accept a flat-out politici-
zation of the nomination process.
The confirmation process can be "rationalized"-made coherent
and consistent-only if the fundamental underlying question is resolved.
Are justices supposed to interpret a law of the Constitution that is fixed
and independent of "judicial will"? If so, then the criterion for Senate
confirmation ought to be the ability of the nominee "to say what the law
is" as well. Are justices supposed to take the majestic generalities of the
Constitution and mold them in accord with their best conceptions of
what a good political order for circumstances like ours would be? If so,
then the criterion for Senate confirmation ought to be the ability of the
nominee to so mold the Constitution.
The Constitution's understanding of the answer to that question
seems clear to me. Justices are to exercise, not will, but judgment. The
fundamental criterion for judicial nominations and confirmation, then,
ought to be the nominees' commitment and ability to read the Constitu-
tion well and to apply it faithfully. And it is the obligation of the Presi-
dent to appoint on the basis of this criterion, and no less the obligation
of the Senate to evaluate his nominees on the same basis.
VII. OBSTACLES TO AN EFFEcTIVE SENATE ROLE
But will the Senate live up to that responsibility? One of the real
obstacles to doing so is the fear politicians have of being labeled "parti-
san." There is a real irony in this. The non-partisan, constitutionally-
based understanding of the judicial role is often attacked today for being
"partisan." This is not really surprising, as those committed to views dif-
ferent from those embodied in the Constitution could be expected to
portray their own views as "constitutional" and those of their opponents
as "partisan." What is more disappointing, if not surprising, is that the
fear of being labeled partisan so often seems to be effective in disarming
Senate opposition to judicial nominees who seem likely to be committed
to an activist judiciary, even when the charges of partisanship come from
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those who have themselves clearly adopted partisan positions.
Perhaps the most obvious case is the severe criticism directed at Re-
publicans in the 1980s for a supposed litmus test on abortion for judicial
nominees. While this litmus test was fully defensible-the Constitution
says nothing about abortion or the modem autonomy right, and there-
fore judges should be expected to rule accordingly-it seems clear that
many Republicans were embarrassed by the charges and denied that
there was such a test. Whether this litmus test existed remains an open
question, though it seems clear that if there were such a test, the Re-
publicans did a poor job of applying it."
At the same time, it was clear that there was a reverse litmus test for
most Democrats, a test not justified by the Constitution itself, but only
by the evolving meanings that liberal jurists have wished to read into it.
This test was evidenced by the Bork nomination controversy as well as
other judicial appointments since 1993, but this litmus test seems curi-
ously uncontested. It is not subject to the same media criticism that the
Republican litmus test faced, and there was no sign of embarrassment
about it among Democrats. And it seems not to be much contested on
the Senate Judiciary Committee today in the consideration of Clinton
nominees.
Why this double standard? It seems likely that the answer to this
question can be found in the political preferences of the academy and
those for whom it provides standards, including the major organs of
public opinion. Even senators and representatives often feel somewhat
intimidated by what are widely regarded as complex legal questions, and
tempted to defer to "expert" opinion on such matters. But the experts,
heavily concentrated in the academy, are generally ideologically sympa-
thetic to activist judges and defend these judges' "constitutional" views.
Loath to challenge the experts, senators and representatives fall into
what might be called a "culture of deference" to the judiciary and the
legal intellectuals who provide their defense.
Moreover, being tarred with the public accusation of being "parti-
san" in handling judicial nominations is obviously undesirable. Insofar
as politicians-especially those who do not have very safe seats-are
naturally "risk-averse," they may be tempted to avoid taking stands that
may be easily misrepresented to the constituents in the next election.
The most recent form of pressure on the Senate to abdicate their
constitutional responsibilities has been the criticism of the Senate Judi-
87. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (where five Republican
appointees refused to overturn the central holding of Roe v. Wade).
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ciary Committee for not approving presidential nominations of lower
court judges more quickly." In some ways, this smacks of the political
struggle over creating a government "shutdown" that occurred during
President Clinton's first term. The Republican Congress and the
Democratic President fought bitterly over a variety of budget issues, and
the government had to shut down for a period of time, until Congress-
successfully tagged in public opinion with being responsible for the shut-
down-gave way and legislation to authorize government action was
passed. (Why the Republicans had any more responsibility than the
President for the shutdown was never very clear. It took both sides to
create a stalemate, after all.)
Likewise, the possibility of stalemate looms over any Senate that
would reject presidential nominees for judicial office on the grounds
that they were not committed to proper interpretation of the Constitu-
tion. Senate rejection, after all, simply leads to another presidential
nomination. In the meantime, responsibility for vacancies in the judici-
ary can be laid at the feet of the obstructing Senate. Fear of being suc-
cessfully characterized as partisan obstructionists seems likely to have
been a factor in Republican reluctance to challenge President Clinton's
judicial nominations and the willingness of the Republican Senate even
to push through many judicial nominations in the waning days of the
105th Congress. 9
This is a failure of will, I believe, on the part of those who have a re-
sponsibility for participating in the judicial nomination process and a re-
sponsibility to oppose the confirmation of judges who are committed to
judicial activism, which is inconsistent with the Constitution. Neither
"legal experts" nor those who raise cries of partisanship when there is
opposition to "political" positions on sound "constitutional" grounds
should be permitted to intimidate those who hold such responsibility.
VIII. THE SENATE'S ROLE
The protection of constitutional rights is ensured because their roots
in the Constitution will prevent them from being set aside with fluctua-
88. See, e.g., Dan Carney, More Challenges to Clinton Nominees Cause Judicial Stale-
mate, 55 CONGR. Q. WKLY. REP. 2912 (1997).
89. Judicial Selection Nomination Project of the Center for Law and Democracy at the
Free Congress Foundation, WKLY. UPDATE (Oct. 28,1998). This report notes that no Clinton
nominee had ever been defeated in the Senate Judiciary Committee or on the Senate floor
(though this did not account for nominees whose likely defeat led to withdrawal of the nomi-
nation). On the other hand, one should note that Clinton's Supreme Court nominees, in par-
ticular, have been less activist than they might have been.
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tions in public opinion. The habit of judges informally revising the Con-
stitution to add new rights creates the conditions for revising it by sub-
tracting rights as well. Only adherence to the fixed meaning of the Con-
stitution can give us the confidence that we will achieve the purposes of
"a government of laws, not men."
Limiting the judicial function to interpreting the Constitution guar-
antees the political branches their legitimate powers, which keeps poli-
cymaking in the hands of those who are most accountable to the people
so that the laws of our society are truly based on popular consent and
not on the preferences (even if they are well-intentioned) of just one
segment of it. In many cases even the "line-drawing" that must some-
times be done between freedom and license, between a just recognition
of and an excessive pursuit of equality, must be done by representatives
subject to popular control. Self-government is not a need that stops as
soon as "rights" become an issue, giving way to rule by judges.
The crucial questions underlying the confirmation process are
whether the Senate considers itself bound by the Constitution, and by its
provision for a limited, i.e., nonlegislative, form of judicial review and
whether it demands that nominees share such a view in order to be con-
firmed. If it does, that will provide fair grounds for opposing nominees
who are committed to different views of judicial power. The Senate's
power of advice and consent is a broad one, though it is not arbitrary. A
fair interpretation of the qualities required of judicial nominees by the
Constitution emphasizes legal capacity, personal integrity, and a com-
mitment to abide by and defend the Constitution.9° No fear of accusa-
tions of partisanship should prevent a Senate from actively insisting that
judicial nominees meet these constitutional requirements.
90. I note in passing a complicated question that the Senate must consider in applying
constitutional standards. Even originalists committed to the authority of the Constitution
may accept that, under certain circumstances, an unbroken and largely unchallenged string of
precedents may be authoritative, even where the original decision was incorrect. In evaluat-
ing nominees, then, senators can legitimately include consideration of precedent in evaluating
candidates. For further discussion of this point, see Chapter 8 of my book HOW TO READ
THE CONSTITUTION: ORIGINALISM, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, AND JUDICIAL
POWER (1996).
1999]

